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SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
IN THE STATE COURTS
THERE HAS BEEN a tendency in recent years to relax the requirements
which must be met before a state court may assert jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation.1 The foreruner in this development has been a
Maryland statute2 which abandons any requirement of extended activity
within the state as a condition of jurisdiction and exposes foreign cor-
porations to service of process on any cause of action arising out of a
contract executed or a tort committed within the state.3 Following in
this trend is an even more progressive North Carolina statute,4 which,
in addition to allowing suits against foreign corporations arising out of
isolated local contracts or torts, would also permit suits on a cause of
action deriving from mere local business solicitations, by mail or other-
wise." Further, by its broadest section, this statute would expose a
foreign corporation to local suit on a claim arising out of the production
or distribution of goods with the reasonable expectation that the goods
would be consumed in North Carolina.6 Although neither statute has
'The traditional view is that single or isolated transactions are not sufficient bases
for jurisdiction. E.g., Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., z6o U.S. 516 (i922). See
generally, BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89.4.-9I.i (i935); iS FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS § 8713 (Rev. and perm. ed. 1933). The modern test now emerging is based on
reason and limited only by the requirement that the jurisdiction asserted must not be
contrary to "fair play and substantial justice." See McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations: Actions Arising Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALIF. L. REv.
331 (1946).
2 MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 88(d) (Flack 1951).
"'Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State by a resident of
this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this State on any cause of
action arising out of a contract made within the State, whether or not such foreign
corporation is doing or has done business in this State." MD. CODE ANN. art. 23,
§ 88(d) (Flack 195i).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1955).
"Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State by a resident of this
State or by a person having a usual place of business in this State . . . on any cause of
action arising as follows: (i) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed
in this State; or (z) Out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise if
the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating
thereto were accepted within or without the State; or . . . (4) Out of tortious conduct
in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising
out of misfeasance or nonfeasance. See note 4 supra.
o "Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State
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yet been fully tested in the courts, 7 the recent holding in Compania Do
Astral v. Boston Metals Co.8 seems favorably disposed toward the Mary-
land act.
A foreign corporation was sued in Maryland for the breach of a con-
tract executed within the state.0 Although the defendant had not quali-
fied to do business locally and had had no previous contacts within the
state, jurisdiction in the matter was urged to have been conferred by the
liberal terms of the Maryland statute. The Maryland court of appeals,
affirming the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction, held that applica-
tion of the statute was not inconsistent with the requirements of due
process.' ° At the same time, however, the court found that, though the
defendant had executed but one contract within the state, the nature
and extent of that contract was such as to involve a number of significant
local "contacts."' 1 It is not unlikely that these contacts were substantial
enough to sustain jurisdiction even under well-accepted principles; and
the decision, therefore, cannot be taken as an unqualified approval of the
Maryland statute.'
Courts, in the days of the power-over-the-present-person concept of
and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced,
manufactured, marketed, or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent
contractors or dealers." See note 4 supra.
'Since its enactment in 1937 the Maryland statute has been the subject of heated
controversy. See generally, Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over Foreign
Corporations Under the Act of 1937, 3 MD. L. REv. 35 (938); Legis. Note, 38
COLUM. L. REv. io6o (1938) 5 Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R.
Co. 49 F. Supp. 807 (D.Md. 1943). In Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89
F. Supp. 654 (D.Md. 195o), the only other case decided under this statute, the action
stemmed from a negligent misrepresentation by defendant corporation's salesman con-
cerning machinery sold to the resident plaintiff. Defendant's activities of regular and
continuous solicitation were held sufficient "minimum contacts" to make jurisdiction over
it "reasonable." The case presented small challenge to the statute's constitutionality
however, since the decision would probably have been the same under a statute with a
"doing business" test. See Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 500 (595i). No cases have yet
arisen under the North Carolina statute, which became effective May 20, 1955.
8 107 A.2d 357 (Md. x954).
The contract was entered into after many months of negotiation, for the sale of two
vessels in the Baltimore harbor. By the terms of the contract, Maryland law was ex-
pressly made controlling. A Baltimore bank held $85,ooo in escrow for liquidated
damages.
"0 Objections based upon denial of due process may concern issues of procedure, which
deal with the propriety of service of process; or substance, which are concerned with
the power of the state to authorize jurisdiction. This note considers only the latter.
"See note 9 supra.
12 See note 7 supra.
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jurisdiction, 13 rationalized the amenability of a foreign corporation 14 to
process on the ground that the state, having the power to exclude such
a corporation,-5 could require its submission to the jurisdiction of the
state courts as a condition of doing business within its borders.16 And
even where a foreign corporation conducted business without having
qualified to do so, it was deemed to have "impliedly consented" to juris-
diction.17  This fiction was vitiated, however, by construction of the
" For an excellent exposition of this rationale, see McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(x916). See also, Mr. Justice Holmes' historical summary in Michigan Trust Co. v.
Ferry, zz8 U.S. 346, 353 (191±). Traditionally, in personam jurisdiction was based
upon "allegiance," "domicile," "presence," or "consent." This note discusses only the
last two.
"' Pertinent to the problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporation is the separate
development in the law of jurisdiction over non-resident individuals. The early rule,
announced in Pennoyer vz. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), denied in personam jurisdiction
over non-resident individualsi non-resident motorist statutes have cut into this rule.
Kane v. New Jersey, 24z U.S. 16o (i916)5 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
This variation was later extended to include cases involving contracts for the sale of
securities within a state. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (I935).
Since both types of cases involve activities which vitally concern the state, the holdings
were based upon the principle of the state's overriding right of regulation. See GooD-
RIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWs inS (3d ed. i949). Any further extension of jurisdiction was
believed to be unconstitutional. Thus, Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1918), rea-
soned that, since jurisdiction over foreign corporations was derived from the state's right
to exclude them, a similar rule could not apply to non-resident individuals. In recent
years, however, the Flexner doctrine has begun to give way to tests of "reasonableness"i
and the coalescence of the jurisdictional rules applicable to the foreign corporation and
the non-resident individual appears inevitable, if not already accomplished by the case
of International Shoe vt. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Note, 3 DUKE B.J.
78 (1953) ; Note, Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 523,
534 (1949). As a result, a number of states have enacted statutes granting jurisdiction
over non-resident individuals. Most such statutes invoke the "doing business" test. Cf.
ILL. STAT. ANN. 104.017 (Jones 1955).
"See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) (i86g), in which the court ob-
served that the state had the right to exclude a foreign corporation from transacting
business within its borders, on the strength of the dictum in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 277 (1839), to the effect that a corporation was not a "citizen" under
Article IV of the Constitution, and thus not entitled to the privileges and immunities
guaranteed therein.
'a Statutes in every state require a foreign corporation, which intends to do business
within the state, to qualify by appointing an agent for service of process. This note is
concerned only with the situation where there has been no such qualification.
"' It was first thought impossible to gain jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
other than by an in rem proceeding, except when it had consented. M'Queen v. Middle-
town Manufacturing Co., 16 Johns. 5 (N.Y. 1819). Later the -theory of "implied
consent" was formulated to uphold statutes authorizing in personam service. Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (i8 How.) 340 (1855). At first, "consent" was implied
from the acts constituting doing business in the statei but when the corporation clearly
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commerce clause 8 which denied a state the right completely to exclude
corporations doing interstate business. 1
A more durable approach to the problem was the application of the
theory that presence is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, and that a corpora-
tion 20 is "present" where it is doing business." Here, the chief difficulty
manifested no intention to consent, it was implied in law on the basis of the right to
exclude. See, e.g., Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal Co. 22z Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i.
"
9In 191o, judicial construction of the commerce clause denied a state the right to
exclude from state courts foreign corporations which had not complied with state laws
requiring appointment of agents. International Text Book v. Pigg, 2 17 U.S. 91 (1910) I
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914). Nor could the state expel or exces-
sively fine a corporation exclusively engaged in interstate commerce for non-compliance.
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). But as to intrastate commerce carried on
by a corporation also engaged in interstate commerce, cf. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U.S.
65o (1896); Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U.S. i (191o) Interstate Amusement Co.
v. Albert, 239 U.S. 56o (i916); Davis v. Farmer's Co-op., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
Although a state may not exclude an interstate corporation, it may validly impose rea-
sonable conditions on admission. Amenability to jurisdiction has been held to be a
reasonable condition. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917). See generally Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 17 MINN. L.
REv. 270 (1933) 5 McGowan, Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Comnercti 33 ILL.
L. REV. 875 (1939) ; 46 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1946). For discussion of the commerce
clause objections to the Maryland statute (which were not raised in Astral v. Boston
Metals), see Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over Foreign Corporations, 3
Mn. L. REV. 35 (-937).
2'. The rule as to partnerships, and other unincorporated business associations, is that
if the partnership is subject to suit as a separate entity in the jurisdiction-seeking state,
or in the state of residence of the partnership, the "doing business" test of foreign cor-
porations is applicable to it by the employment of the comity clause. See, e.g., Hemphill
v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1927); Esteve Bros. v. Harrell, 272 Fed. 382 ( 5 th Cir. 1921);
Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS § 86 (1934);
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 86.x (1935); Magruder and Foster, Jurisdiction over
Partnerships, 37 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1924). If the members of the partnership are
subject to suit only as individuals, however, a different rule applies. See, e.g., Western
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros., 43 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Iowa 1941). The Inter-
national Shoe decision would seem to require only that the partnership have "certain
minimum contacts" within the state to subject it as an entity, or the partners as indi-
viduals, to jurisdiction. See, e.g., ARK. STATS. ANN. 27-340 (1947), Gillioz v. Kincan-
non, 213 Ark. 1014, 214 S.W.2d 212 (1948); Note, 3 ARK. L. REV. 22 (1947).
2 An early recognition of the "presence" theory was forestalled by Mr. Justice
Taney's geographical approach in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 277,
282 (1839): "[The corporation] exists only in contemplation of law . .. and where
that law ceases to operate ... the corporation can have no existence." After being
foreshadowed in the state [Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57 (1855)]
and English courts [Newby v. Von Oppen, [1872] 7 Q.B. 293] the theory was adopted
in Barrow Steampship Co. v. Kane, 570 U.S. 100 (x897). The "presence" doctrine
1956] NOTES
lay in the determination of what transactions were embraced by the
rather inexact concept of "doing business."22 Eventually, however, the
term came to be regarded as but a conclusion of fact reached after ap-
plying a standard of reasonableness to the claim of jurisdiction asserted. 23
The landmark case in this development was International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,4 in which the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction is
constitutionally asserted so long as such assertion does not violate "tra-
ditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice. '25 To satisfy this
standard, "certain minimum contacts ' 26 are required, the emphasis being
on the nature rather than the quantity of the contacts.
Considered in the light of this progression, these two new statutes
appear, not as sweeping innovations, but rather as logical steps in a
gradual development. Since this development has reached the point
where jurisdiction over foreign corporations requires only certain mini-
mum activity within the state, the statutes can be harmonized with that
gradually replaced the "consent" theory; and, after Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
McKibbin, 24.3 U.S. 264 (i926), it became the entrenched rule. For historical discus-
sion, see Henderson, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, c. 5 (1928).
22 In interpreting the term "doing business," certain conventions have developed.
Isolated transactions are not enough. Hunter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 218 U.S. 573
(i9io). The transactions must be continuous or prospectively continuous. Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). Mere solicitation is not "doing busi-
ness." Green v. Chicago B.&Q. Ry., zo5 U.S. 530 (1907). But solicitation plus any
extra activity, however, is sufficient. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579 (igi+). Advertising is not enough. Harrell v. Peters Cartridge Co., 36 Okla.
684, 129 Pac. 872 (1913).
22A clear articulation of this approach is voiced by Judge Hand, in commenting on
the International Shoe doctrine: "The Court . . . [gave]a new explanation to corporate
Cpresence," for it held that ... the court must balance the conflicting interests involved:
i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the action at home outweighs the
burden imposed upon the defendant corporation .... " Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
166 F.zd 788, 7.90 (2d Cir. 2948).
"' 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Mr. Chief Justice Stone delivered the opinion for a unani-
mous Court.
" Id., at 3 16.
2" Naturally, there is difficulty in determining what constitutes "minimum contacts."
In one case, a single act of negligence in repairing a roof was held sufficient. Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, so A.2d 664 (i95i), note So MICH. L.
REV. 763 (1951); 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 117 (1951)i z6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 713
(1950 ; oo U. PA. L. REV. 598 (195z). In Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (195o), the sending of insurance contracts by mail was deemed to be sufficient
"minimum contacts," but this holding loses some force from the fact that the decision was
five to four, and the case involved a state regulatory statute. The same result was
reached, however, in Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.S.C. 1946).
2 Id., at 9o.
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requirement if it is recognized that their only novelty is to redefine
"minimum contacts" '28 as activity which is of such a nature that its ulti-
mate effect is injury to a person within the state.
This semantic exercise only demonstrates that the current "minimum
contacts" test can logically be expanded to accommodate the broad pro-
visions of both the North Carolina and the Maryland statutes. Whether
such an accommodation is reasonable, however, may be quite another
question.29 The flexibility of the "minimum contacts" test should not
obscure the fact that out-of-state parties must, in fairness, be protected
against unreasonable inconveniences in defending suits involving incon-
sequential transactions. On the other hand, however, if the seemingly
isolated transactiohs of a corporation are regarded not as sporadic at-
tempts to do business within a state, but rather as an integral part of the
corporation's over-all scheme of activity, much of the unfairness is dis-
sipated. Since the profits of interstate business can be substantial, it does
not seem unreasonable to impose on a corporation the expense of de-
fending claims arising in the deliberate pursuit of these profits.
GERALD R. GIBBONS
28 See generally, MeBaine, Jurisdiction O'ver Foreign Corporations, 34 CALIF. L.
REV. 331 (1946). One of the better arguments for extending jurisdiction is the diffi-
culty in the administration of the "minimum contacts" test. There would certainly be
less confusion if the line representing "reasonableness" were drawn at "any cause of
action arising within the state," rather than at "minimum contacts." Difficulty con-
ceded, however, justice rather than ease of administration is the end sought, and the
cutting of the "gordian knot" in such a manner seems unjustified.
"Mr. Justice Black takes the position that jurisdiction is a state concern which
should be determined by the states themselves, free from due process review. Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (x945) (concurring opinion) i Travelers
Health Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (.950).
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